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book review

Troublesome Reﬂection: Racism as the Blind Spot
in the Scientiﬁc Critique of Race
Charles C. Roseman1

A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History, by Nicholas Wade. New York: Penguin Press,
2014. x + 278 pp. 978-1-5942-0446-3 (hardcover). US $27.95.

I

n A Troublesome Inheritance, Nicholas Wade
seeks to use advances in genomics and comparative human biology to revivify hereditarian
racialist notions about the ways in which diffferences among human societies are shaped by evolutionary forces acting on genetic variation. The arc
of the argument consists of three claims: (1) human
evolution has produced some unspecifĳied number
of races; (2) diffferences among these races in social
dispositions have a strong genetic component; and
(3) an oppressive academic environment keeps
this kind of research out of the intellectual mainstream. These claims form the core of a world view
that I refer to as “hereditarian racialism.” Recent
examples of this genera include The Bell Curve
(Herrnstein and Murray 1994) and Race, Evolution,
and Behavior (Rushton 1995), with examples extending back for some time (e.g., Grant 1970 [1912]).
None of these claims are true. The book is neither
good popular science writing nor all that new or
interesting by the standards of the hereditarian
racialist literature. (Rushton [1995] and Miele and
Sarich [2005] are far more interesting examples of
this genera.) Troublesome Inheritance, however, is a
useful foil for a critical examination of the mainline
scientifĳic critique of hereditarian racialism, which,
as it stands, is weak and scattered. To recuperate a
useful scientifĳic critique of race, we need to come

to grips with ways in which the political processes
of racism have shaped human organisms over the
last few hundred years.

Genomic Variation and Human
Population History and Structure
Contrary to Wade’s assertion, all parties to controversies surrounding human variation agree that
humans show genomic and phenotypic variation
that is structured in geographic space, through
time, and across many social divisions. The disagreement is over how best to describe and model
the evolutionary causes of this variation. Ignoring
for the moment the large changes in the distribution of human genetic variation over the last few
centuries (more on that below under Evolutionary
Consequences of Racism), we can build a range of
evolutionary models and statistically compare their
fĳit to available genomic data.
In this idiom, racial models of variation like
the one advocated in Troublesome Inheritance
take the form of something like the tree diagram
in Figure 1A (Hunley et al. 2009; Long and Kittles
2003). Groups within a race share common ancestry with one another more recently than they
do with groups in other races. In contrast, most
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FIGURE 1. Models of population structure and history. Black lines indicate evolving lineages and

recency of common ancestry, with time going from le to right. The numbered tips of the lineages
are operationally deﬁned groups of individuals. The length of a line segment reﬂects the cumulative
eﬀect of genetic dri , not time elapsed. (A) The race model as classically conceived and argued
for by Wade. Group membership in races is indicated by encompassing boxes. (B) An elaborated
model with a complex pattern of common ancestry, gene ﬂow, and admixture among groups.
Double arrows indicate recurring gene ﬂow between groups, and single arrows indicate episodes of
admixture.

narrative accounts of recent human evolution
feature population fĳissioning and founding events
reflecting the movement of groups into diffferent regions (previously occupied or not; see, e.g.,
Henn et al. 2012). Out-of-Africa dispersals and
the spread of agriculture are two examples of
these kinds of events. In this case, we might start
with an estimate of a tree of patterns of common
ancestry among groups under the expectation
that groups with more recent common ancestry
should be more genetically similar than those with
distant common ancestry (Long and Kittles 2003,
2009; Long et al. 2009; Pickrell and Pritchard
2012). We can then add in admixture (episodic
mixing of previously isolated groups) and gene
flow between groups to produce a more elaborate
model (Hunley et al. 2009; Pickrell and Pritchard
2012; Prüfer et al. 2014). The result is something
like the elaborate model sketched out in Figure
1B, which is far and away the best fĳit to population
genomic data. The relative importance of the
diffferent processes that make up these models are
still a matter for further research, but it is certain
that the racial model is a poor fĳit to the data and
does not allow us to generate new and interesting
questions.

In the case of Wade’s second claim about amonggroup diffferences in innate social propensities,
he admits that much of his work is speculative,
and I shall not engage with the bulk of it. He does
make statements of what he regards as matters of
fact about relationships between race and skull
morphology. I focus on skull morphology because
we know quite a bit about its evolution, and how it
is used in Troublesome Inheritance will be an indicator of the rigor with which issues in phenotypic
evolution are represented throughout the book.
Wade makes the claim that “human skulls fall
into three distinctive shapes, which reflect their
owner’s degree of ancestry in the three main races,
Caucasian, East Asian, and African” (***) and that
skulls can be matched with race with better than
80% success. Wade claims that a fĳive-race taxonomy enjoys genomic support, and even though fĳive
does not equal three, he still gestures back to skull
morphology as proof of race. The fĳirst thing to point
out is that these techniques (discriminant function
analysis) require races to be defĳined ahead of time,
and then a statistical model is built that maximizes
the diffferences between the predefĳined groups.
The techniques do not fĳind groups; they simply
assign individuals to groups. There is not a stitch of
evolutionary theory informing this practice.
If we use the discriminant function methods to
test whether pairs of predefĳined groups are races, we
end up with races galore, not the inconsistently enumerated few from Troublesome Inheritance. People
from northern and southern Japan would come
from diffferent races, as would those from Austria
and Norway (Ousley et al. 2009). Moreover, these
techniques behave badly when challenged with
skulls of individuals from groups not included in
the samples used to build the methods and are often
no better than random chance (Konigsberg et al.
2009). You will not read in Troublesome Inheritance
that we know that random genetic drift, mutation,
and gene flow have led to a pattern and magnitude
of among-group cranial variation that bears a hazy
resemblance to what we gather from population
genomic analysis (Betti et al. 2010; von CramonTaubadel 2014; Lynch 1990; Relethford 1994; Roseman 2004; Weaver et al. 2008). Exceptions to this
general trend appear in the form of natural selection
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and nongenetic efffects acting in population- and
region-specifĳic ways. The rapidity of human cranial
evolution is unusual among mammals and presents
a vital window into issues of constraint and evolvability that are at the core of current problems in
evolutionary theory (Lynch 1990; Martinez-Abadias
et al. 2012; Weaver et al. 2007, 2008).
It is telling that Troublesome Inheritance omits
any reference to this work, especially since it is a
nexus between the study of phenotypes and genomes of the kind that Wade thinks brings so much
explanatory power to problems in human evolution
(Roseman and Weaver 2007). Instead, he bases
his arguments about the cranium on a forensic
literature that has no evolutionary content and
offfers no causal explanation for variation. The lack
of rigor in dealing with this relatively simple issue
makes me doubt the veracity of his claims about
other aspects of phenotype.

A Badly Run Conspiracy
I think that the primary reason for ignoring the
hereditarian racialist literature on intelligence and
other psychological characteristics has little to do
with peer pressure. This point is hard to prove and
certainly merits some investigation by a qualifĳied
social scientist, but my own impression from talking to colleagues is that the avoidance stems from
the fact that these traits are difffĳicult to study, and
the work that is being done on them is seen as
being largely of bad quality. Contemporary scholars
of human variation do not avoid talking about
the interactions between biological evolution and
human societies in cases where we have the data,
methods, and theory to do so with rigor. The ways
in which humans, plants, animals, and pathogens
have coevolved during the development of agriculture and pastoralism are exciting and vibrant fĳields
of research (Kwiatkowski 2005; Perry et al. 2007;
Gignoux et al. 2011; Skoglund et al. 2014). Socially
mediated genotype-by-environment interactions
are also the object of increasing scrutiny (Gravlee
et al. 2009).
The diversity of opinion about the causes and
patterning of human variation within the scientifĳic
community (see Edgar and Hunley 2009) would
seem to indicate that if there is a conspiracy to
silence hereditarian racialist views, it is very badly

235

run. Some of this variation in opinion is the result
of the practice of good science, in which multiple
explanations for problems are put forth and argued
about. Some of the variation in opinion, however,
could be a product of the fragmentation of the
study of human biology (Auerbach and Cabana
2013). Molecular and morphological specialists
were famously at odds with each other for years
(Lubenow 1992: 83), and even specialists in different parts of anatomy do not communicate in
a way that would allow for a unifĳied view of the
human organism. There is a very real risk that this
conceptual drawing and quartering of the human
organism and the inconsistencies that stem from
it contribute to the evolutionary sciences’ less than
coherent critique of hereditarian racialism.

Troublesome Reﬂection
For all its failures, Troublesome Inheritance does
provide scholars of human biology with a foil that
we can use to evaluate our standard critique of hereditarian racialism. My own view of the image cast
back at me from Wade’s book is that the critique
is both weak and in need of considerable revision.
Take the oft-cited observation that the proportion of variation within races is a small fraction of
the overall variation both in absolute terms and
relative to other organisms (Lewontin [1972] gives
the fĳirst estimate, and it is cited in places as far
afĳield as political philosophy [e.g., Appiah 1985]).
Estimating this proportion assumes that races are
actually there. Without a racial or other unrealistic
model, this statistic has no evolutionary interpretation (Long and Kittles 2003). The same applies to
partitioning among-population variation without
nesting populations into races. By deploying this
fact as though it carries substantial evolutionary
meaning, a critic of hereditarian racialism is arguing about how much of the variation race might
account for and what social implications it might
entail while implicitly conceding that a racial taxonomy is legitimate.
Likewise, scientists often appeal to isolation by
distance, which proposes an equilibrium between
the among-group diversifying efffect of random
genetic drift and homogenizing efffects of gene flow
among neighboring groups (Wright 1943), when
talking about human variation (Eisenberg and
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Hayes 2011; Handley et al. 2007). This includes recent responses to Troublesome Inheritance in online
popular science venues (Fuentes 2014; Rafff 2014).
Isolation by distance fares little better than the
race model when fĳit to human population genomic
data (Hunley et al. 2009), dulling any critique of
hereditarian racialism that uses it.
The most perplexing thing about both Wade’s
insistence that there are races in the taxonomic
sense and the fĳixation on dispelling notions of
biological race on the part of critics of hereditarian racialism is that the existence of biological
races is not a necessary condition for an argument
about the coevolution of society and behavior in
diffferent parts of the world. Evolved among-group
diffferences require only genetic variation and the
action of evolutionary forces (Lewontin 1974). It
does not matter if spatial diffferences in the bulk
of the genome are racially patterned or entirely
clinal. Wade could have caused the critique of
hereditarianism racialism a considerable bother
had he pointed this out.
One point of agreement among nearly all parties is that we can say with some certainty what
human variation was like at a single point in time
and that this point in time is uniquely relevant
to problems of race today. This anthropological
genetic present is usually conceived of as being
sometime in the mid-15th century before transoceanic European conquest and colonialism (Marks
1995). It tends to be marked through the use of the
present tense. Hereditarian racialism holds that
there really are races (read: were in the anthropological genetic present) while conceding some
blurriness of boundaries between races. Its critics
often claim that human variation really is clinal but
allow that the rate of change of a trait in space can
vary. Neither claim reflects the present distribution
of genetic variation in social or geographic spaces,
and neither question is framed in such a way that
answers to them could be informative about race
and genetics today.

The Evolutionary Consequences
of Racism
The peril of situating arguments about genetics and
race in the anthropological genetic present is that it
allows us to talk about race without talking about

racism. This stymies our attempts to make sense
of race and genetics because the only coherent
theories of race depend on the explanatory power
of racism. The sociologist and philosopher W. E. B.
Du Bois and his inheritors model race and racism
as being coconstituted in a political process acting
on multigenerational time scales (Du Bois 1903,
1920; Carbonella and Kasmir 2008; Harrison 1992;
Visweswaran 1998). This is in opposition to the view
anthropologists receive from Franz Boas that race
is primary and that racism arises from conflict between races and can be mitigated primarily through
race mixture (Boas 1921).
In this view, races—or, more properly, racialized groups—are produced as people enact
political control or have political control enacted
on them in the form of economic exploitation, segregation, genocide, dispossession, or other depredations. By this rationale, an African American race
emerges over several generations from a disparate
set of groups of people with no previous sense of
kinship through the sharing of a history of slavery
and struggle against it and other forms of racism
(Du Bois 2007; Visweswaran 1998). Diffferent ways
of reckoning race in diffferent parts of the world are
the product of the several manifestations of racism.
For the remainder of this essay I use race to refer
to the general processes of marking individuals
and grouping them through racism and “racialized
groups” to refer to the groups that are formed by
these processes. The dynamics of racialization as
motivated by racism are historically contingent,
and multiple racial formations each with their own
way of delineating racialized groups have been
produced at diffferent times and places by various
kinds of racism.
Coupled with an eye toward how racism governs reproduction and inheritance (Fields 1990;
Hollinger 2003), this way of modeling race might
clarify our view of the relationship between race
and genetics in the present day. This is particularly
relevant to the role that race plays in issues in
medicine and public health. In these cases, we
are not so interested in the genetic variation in
the Late Middle Ages as we are in the relationships among genetic variation, race, and health in
the present day. This requires an explanation of
how the intergenerational efffects of the political
management of reproduction and inheritance of
status have shaped genetic variation.
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By way of example, take a city in the US
Midwest with a majority white population and
a substantial minority representation of African
Americans as tallied by the US Census. Were we to
sample the genomes of the inhabitants of this city,
we would fĳind a substantial departure from HardyWeinberg-Castle equilibrium (HWCE), the model
of what happens to genetic variation if random
mating prevails and no evolutionary processes
are at work. HWCE serves as the starting point for
most evolutionary genetic problems, and such a
large deviation from its expectation begs for an
evolutionary explanation.
Genetics is the study of resemblances among
relatives. Many of the ways in which race was codifĳied into law and incorporated into custom were to
govern who was to marry whom and how one could
issue political status to one’s offfspring (Hollinger
2003; Pascoe 1996). In the case of the black/white
racial dichotomy that has so defĳined American life,
antimiscegenation statutes punished couplings
across racialized groups, and rules of hypodescent
ensured fĳidelity in the inheritance of status (Pascoe
1996). The departure from HWCE in our example
is the product of racism’s (and sexism’s) past and
ongoing roles in governing reproduction.
Thus, the allele frequency diffferences that we
see between racialized groups as people understand and experience them today are in part the
product of racism acting to shape genetic variation.
So too are the vast changes in the distribution of
human genetic variation seen over the last few centuries arising from the dispossession and genocide
of indigenous peoples, forced migration of enslaved
people, and the establishment of colonial and settler populations. The diffferent racisms that shaped
and continue to shape racialized groups across the
world mean that any racism might shape genetic
variation in a variety of ways through regulation of
reproduction and inheritance of status. Put bluntly,
racism has been a potent driver of human evolution
over the last few centuries because of the way it
afffects relatedness and the inheritance of genes.
Contrary to Wade’s version of history, genes
probably played a largely passive role in race and
human afffairs over the last several hundred years.
Rather than natural selection evolving genetic
propensities for diffferent political systems around
the world, alleles drafted along in the wake of the
racisms that defĳine racialized groups and continue
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to shape and govern their boundaries through the
regulation of reproduction. This builds incidental correlations between racialized groups and
genetic variation. Some of this genetic variation
may contribute to phenotypic diffferences, some of
which may present fairly sharp distinctions along
racial lines such that they become racialized and
used as a means of identifĳication and drawing
social distinctions. Race and racism also construct
environments in which humans grow, live, and die,
leading to a confounding of genetic and environmental efffects on phenotype (Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman 1973; Gravlee et al. 2009; Gravlee 2009;
Lewontin 1975; Reverby 2010). Both are inherited
through diffferent kinds of paths (i.e., genetic vs.
social/legal), but the intergenerational persistence
of racism can cause these modes of inheritance to
covary with one another, calling into question our
ability to assign the causes of diffference to either
environment or genes.
We cannot explain the relationships among
genes, race, and health outcomes without talking
about the impact of racism both on living people
and on their ancestors. Everything from life span
(Edwards and Tuljapurkar 2005) to sexually transmitted infections (Handcock and Jones 2006) is
afffected by this historically contingent set of racial
dynamics. This is for the simple reason that the
present confĳiguration of races and distribution
of genetic variation is what is relevant for human
well-being now and in the future. Understanding the prehistoric predicates for this variation is
important to establish some sense of initial conditions, but it is insufffĳicient for understanding the
here and now. Without incorporating the efffects
of racism into models of human variation today,
we will not be able to have a cohesive theory of
genes and race, and the scientifĳic critique of race
will continue to have no teeth.
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